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THE SUBSTANTIVE TAX REFORM PROJECT:
PRELIMINARY FINDINGS ON THE CORPORATE TAX*
by
Charles 0. Galvin**

E

I.

HISTORY OF THE PROJECT

VEN before the sixteenth amendment, the Corporation Excise Tax of
1909 had provided for an excise tax on all corporations measured by a
percentage of income.! In the beginning rates on corporate and individual
incomes were modest. The corporate rate under the 1909 Act was one per
cent on incomes over $5,000. During subsequent years rates progressed
steadily upward, so that by the time of the Revenue Act of 1951 a normal
tax of thirty per cent was imposed on all income and an additional twentytwo per cent on income over $25,000. The Revenue Act of 1964 reduced
the normal tax to twenty-two per cent and increased the surtax on incomes over $25,000 to twenty-six per cent. In addition to the corporate income tax, excess profits taxes were imposed during World War I, World
War II, and the Korean War.
With respect to individual incomes, a normal tax of one per cent and a
surtax rate of one per cent progressing to six per cent were imposed under
the 1913 Act. In World War I the surtax rate progressed to sixty-five per
cent at the top. Normal tax and surtax rates were reduced in the Twenties,
the surtax rate at the highest bracket being twenty per cent for the years
1925 to 1931. Both normal and surtax rates were increased in the Thirties
to finance the social and economic legislation of the New Deal Era and increased further in the Forties to finance World War II, with a normal tax
of three per cent and a top surtax rate of ninety-one per cent.' Some re* This paper is abstracted from the book: STUDIES IN SUBSTANTIVE TAx REFORM, published
in December 1968, under the sponsorship of the American Bar Foundation and Southern Methodist
University. The book is under the general editorship of Arthur B. Willis, Esq., of Los Angeles
and will contain contributions by Robert A. Bernstein, Charles 0. Galvin, David J. and Attiat
F. Ott, Gary Robbins, Robert Tinney, Scott Turner, and Arthur B. Willis.
** B.S.C., Southern Methodist University; M.B.A., J.D., Northwestern University; S.J.D., Harvard University. Dean and Professor of Law, Southern Methodist University. Chairman, Special
Committee on Substantive Tax Reform, Section of Taxation, American Bar Association; Chairman,
Special Committee on Substantive Tax Reform, American Bar Association.
I The constitutionality of this tax was sustained in Flint v. Stone Tracy Co., 220 U.S. 107
(1911). The court refused to follow Pollock v. Farmers' Loan & Trust Co., 157 U.S. 429 (1895)
which had declared the income tax imposed by the Wilson Tariff Act of 1894 unconstitutional:
Within the category of indirect taxation, as we shall have further occasion to show,
is embraced a tax upon business done in a corporate capacity, which is the subjectmatter of the tax imposed in the act under consideration. The Pollock Case construed
the tax there levied as direct, because it was imposed upon property simply because
of its ownership. In the present case the tax is not payable unless there be a carrying
on or doing of business in the designated capacity, and this is made the occasion for
the tax, measured by the standard prescribed. The difference between the acts is
not merely nominal, but rests upon substantial differences between the mere ownership of property and the actual doing of business in a certain way.
220 U.S. at 150.
Historically, there have been two income taxes: a normal tax and a surtax. The normal tax
was generally a flat rate, and the surtax, a progressive rate, relatively much higher than the normal
tax. In 1954 Congress combined the two into a single rate table but interest on certain obligations
of the United States was exempted from normal tax. Therefore INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § I(c)
provides for a calculation of the tax in these cases by eliminating the 3% normal tax.
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ductions were made for the years 1946 to 1950, but higher rates were restored to finance the Korean War; rates thereafter remained substantially
high until the reductions effected in 1964.
Until the Forties, individual and corporate rates were not high enough
to cause any profound concern about the income tax. Following World
War II, however, individuals and business organizations evinced greater
concern about the tax. Although economists had been writing about different kinds of taxes for a number of years, it was not until the postWorld War II period that legal scholars began to give any significant attention to the subject. Indeed, prior to World War II, only a few law
schools offered a separate course in federal taxation, and the offering of
multiple courses in taxation in the curricula of law schools did not emerge
generally until the late Forties and early Fifties. The two disciplines, law
and economics, went their separate ways. Economists wrote on the shifting and incidence of taxes, the effect of different kinds of taxes on allocation of resources, and the development of economic models in which the
tax factor was significant. Legal scholars were largely concerned with
technical analysis of tax rules and critiques of the tax impact on various
business and investment patterns. The emphasis in economic writing was
on macro-economic analysis; in legal writing the emphasis was on the application of the law to particular transactional patterns. In the Fifties the
Joint Committee on the Economic Report and the House Committee on
Ways and Means inaugurated multidisciplinary discussions on tax policy
for the future.' These efforts constituted the first major broad scale consideration of tax reform.
It was against this background that the Section of Taxation of the
American Bar Association undertook a major effort in substantive tax reform in 1962. A Special Committee on Substantive Tax Reform was organized to consider fundamental changes in federal tax policy. This was
the first time that a group of private practitioners had undertaken such a
project.' By early 1964, the committee had delineated nineteen items for
particular study and requested the Treasury Department to supply certain
statistical data with respect to them.' The committee was aware that these
items were only a beginning, but it believed that the data would provide
important insights into the general problem and suggest further areas of
exploration. As a trial run the committee proposed an individual income
tax rate schedule of ten to forty per cent and a corporate rate of forty per
cent.
After extensive work in the development of analyses on various assump3 See, e.g., Hearings on General Revenue Revision Before the Comm. on Ways and Means, 85th
Cong., 2d Sess. (1958); HOUSE COMM. ON WAYS AND MEANS, 86TH CONG., 1sT SESS., TAX REVISION COMPENDIUM (3 vols.) (Comm. Print 1960); HOUSE COMM. ON WAYS AND MEANS, 86TH
CONG., lSr SESS., PANEL DISCUSSIONS ON INCOME TAX REVISTON (Comm. Print 1960); JOINT

COMM. ON THE ECONOMIC REPORT, 84TH CONG., IST SE$$., FEDERAL TAX POLICY FOIL ECONOMIC
GROWTH AND STABILITY (Comm. Print 1956).

4See Report of the Board of Governors, 88 ABA REP. 468-70 (1963); Resolutions on Substantive Tax Reform, 16 ABA TAX SECTION ANN. REP. 4-5 (1963). See also Galvin, Tax ReformWhat? Again?, 17 Sw. L.J. 203 (1963).
5 Report of the Special Comm. on Substantive Tax Reform, 17 ABA TAX SECTION ANN. REP.
277, 282 (1964).
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tions, the committee concluded that a group of lawyers working as volunteers on a professional project could not hope to gather all the relevant data
and make the necessary detailed research without a full-time staff." Accordingly, appropriate recommendations were made through the Section of
Taxation to the Board of Governors of the American Bar Association, and,
as a result, a special committee was organized to present the project to the
American Bar Foundation under the directorship of Arthur B. Willis, Esq.,
of the Los Angeles Bar.' The Foundation in early 1967 agreed to sponsor
a pilot, or demonstration, project.
Dr. Benjamin Okner, formerly associate professor of economics at
Ohio State University, served during the summer of 1967 as principal investigator and then accepted a position on the staff of The Brookings Institution.' Thereafter, the American Bar Foundation, in cooperation with
Southern Methodist University, continued the project under Mr. Willis's
direction with Doctors David J. and Attiat Ott of the Department of Economics of Southern Methodist University, as principal investigators. Also
contributing to the project were Professor Robert A. Bernstein and this
author of the School of Law of Southern Methodist University, and Messrs.
Gary A. Robbins, Robert W. Tinney, and J. Scott Turner, graduate student assistants to the Doctors Ott. A comprehensive report of the project
will appear in the American Bar Foundation-Southern Methodist University publication: Studies in Substantive Tax Reform. The Foundation's declination to give further support to the project is regrettable in view of the
excellent working team which Mr. Willis had assembled. However, the
comprehensive report may induce others to continue this most necessary
research, the results of which affect the economic welfare of the entire nation.
II.

SUMMARY

OF PRINCIPAL FINDINGS

Economists frequently allude to a concept of income consistent with
what is known as the Haig-Simons definition; that is, between two points
of time, income consists of net accretions to wealth, or power of consumption, plus the value of transfers of wealth and the market value of rights
exercised in consumption.' In developing two models of a broadened tax
base (BTB, and BTB) the Otts applied the Haig-Simons definition using
'The Committee emphasized that it took no position with respect to any area of inquiry. Nevertheless, various groups objected strenuously to the work of the Committee. See Galvin, More on
Boris Bittker and the Comprehensive Tax Base: The Practicalities of Tax Reform and the ABA's
CSTR, 81 H&v. L. REV. 1016 (1968); Galvin, Progress in Substantive Tax Reform; Work of the
American Bar Association; Treasury Studies; 'What Tax Practitioners Can Do, U. So. CAL. 1965
TAX INsT. 1; Willis, A New Approach to Substantive Tax Reform: A Lawyer's Views, U. So. CAL.
1968 TAX INST. 845; Report of the Special Committee on Substantive Tax Reform, 21 ABA
TAX. SECTION ANN. REP. 734 (1968).

'Report of the Special Comm. on Substantive Tax Reform, 90 ABA REP. 555 (1961).
' For Okner's economic and statistical analysis of proposals for changes in the income tax, see B.
ORNER, INCOME DISTRBUTION AND THE FEDERAL INCOME TAX 77-81 (1966).
' H. SIMONs, PERSONAL INCOME TAXATION 61-62, 206 (1938); Haig, The Concept of Income
-Economic and Legal Aspects, in THE FEDERAL INCOME TAX 7 (R. Haig ed. 1921). The princi-

ple of the Haig-Simons definition has been adopted by the Canadian Royal Commission on Taxation.

3

REPORT OF Tmm ROYAL COmM'se ON TAXATION (CANADA)

39 (1966).
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such data as could be analyzed and programmed on the computer within
the limits of time and resources available. Their major findings are summarized in Table 1.
TABLE I

SUMMARY OF EFFECTS OF BASE BROADENING ON THE TAX BASE; A
COMPARISON OF THE ALTERNATIVE TAX BASES (BTBi AND BTB,)
BTBi

BTBa

1. Old Tax Base (billions of dollars)

230.4

230.4

2. New Tax Base (billions of dollars)
3. Change in Tax Base (billions of dollars)
a. State and local bonds interest
b. Interest on life insurance
c. Employer's contribution to and interest
on profit sharing and pension plans
d. 1. Partnership treatment of corporate profits

481.6

501.3
270.9*
1.1
1.7

Item

251.2

1.1
1.7
7.0
44.1

7.0

179.5
11.2
3.6
.2

58.6
179.5

-

28.7

2.2

2.2

2. Dividends plus capital gains (realized
e.
f.
g.
h.

and unrealized) on corporate stock
Deductions and exemptions
Realized capital gains as ordinary income
Old Age Insurance benefits
Social Security survivors' benefits

i. Imputed rent
j. Unemployment compensation
k. Sick pay

.6

3.6
.2

.6

The stum of items a. through k. equals $283.2 billion under BTB,. Items e. and i. were calculated separately and, in each calculation, mortgage interest on homes ($6.4 billion) and real estate
taxes on homes ($1.9 billion) were treated as nondeductible items. Therefore, the total of $12.3
billion must be eliminated from either item e. or item i. The resultant addition to base is $270.9
billion ($283.2-12.3 billion).

The major differences in BTB, and BTBs are that BTB, excludes imputed rent and attributes corporate profits to the shareholders as partnership income, whereas BTB includes imputed rent on owner-occupied
dwellings, "grosses up" dividends as if there were no corporate tax, and

includes the full amount of capital gains, realized and unrealized, on corporate stock." The Otts used 1965 tax rates on 1964 revenues as obtained
from the Tax File, a carefully selected group of 100,000 individual income
tax returns for 1964."
1 Assume that a taxpayer owns a share of stock in which his cost, or basis is $100, that this
share of the corporate earnings before corporate taxes with respect to this stock is $200, that the
corporate tax is 50%, and that the corporate dividend distribution attributable to this share is $50.
Under the calculations for BTBI, the shareholder's dividend is "grossed up" as if there were no corporate tax, that is, by an additional $50 and the increase in the share value is also added to the
shareholder's income. Thus, this method has approximately the same effect as the partnership treatment because it eliminates the tax at the corporate level and taxes the shareholder on dividends received on a gross-up basis plus the change in value of his stock.
" Four tapes have been prepared for the years 1960, 1962, 1964, and 1966. The Otts used the
1964 tape as the 1966 tape has become available only recently. The 100,000 returns were selected
out of 65 million filed. Some information which does not appear on the returns had to be gleaned
from other sources and programmed with the information appearing on the tape.
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Table 2 reflects that a flat, or proportional, rate ot 14.4 per cent on BTB,
and 13.9 per cent on BTB would produce the same revenue collected in
1964 under the progressive rate structure then in effect.' These results
TABLE 2

COMPARISON OF THE TAX REVENUE EFFECTS
OF ALTERNATIVE BROAD TAX BASES
Item
1. Estimated Tax Revenue From Application
of 1965 Tax Rates to 1964 Brookings Tax

BTB

BTB,

Income Tax (billions of dollars)
2. Tax Revenue From BTB at 1965 Tax Rates
(after revision) (billions of dollars)
3. Flat Tax Rate Needed to Raise Amount in 1'

69.7

69.7

113.3
14.4%

126.4
13.9%

File (Before Tax Revision), plus Actual
1964 Tax Revenue From the Corporate

become even more dramatic when one realizes that there are several major
base-broadening items not taken into account in the Otts' calculations.
Thus, in a major continuing project the base would be further broadened
by the addition of (1) gifts, devises, and inheritances," (2) gains on exchanges not recognized under present rules such as like-kind and reorganization exchanges, (3) unrealized appreciation in all property values,' (4)
conversion of LIFO inventories to FIFO, (5) imputed rent on taxpayer
occupancy or use of properties other than dwellings, (6) unreported income,' and so on. Without the recognition of these items, both BTh5 and
BTB, tend to have a bias against service-related income. What is significant
from the Otts' preliminary findings is that a rate of twelve to fourteen
per cent is possible under one of the broadest possible bases. A rate so low
would provide opportunities for simplification, equity, and ease of administration and thereby eliminate much of the social cost incurred under the
present system.
III.

TAXATION OF THE CORPORATE INCOME STREAM

The Otts proceeded on the assumption that the choice of organizational
form should not be influenced by a more onerous tax burden on one form
3
" The 14.4% rate is the result of using the tax base of $481.6 billion of BTB1 and dividing
into the actual individual and corporate income tax revenue of $69.7 billion. The 13.9% rate is
determined by dividing BTB, of $501.3 billion into $69.7 billion.
1 See note 12 supra.
" Bittker estimates that transfers of wealth by death in 1953 amounted to $23.3 billion. Bittker,
A "Comprehensive Tax Base" as a Goal of Income Tax Reform, 80 HAsv. L. RaV. 925, 945 (1967).
Is It has been estimated that the inclusion of appreciation on publicly held stock (not all stock
or all assets) as ordinary income would have increased the individual income tax yield in 1965 by
at least $1$ to $26 billion. Slawson, Taxing as Ordinay Income the Appreciation of Publicly Held
Stock, 76 YALE L.J. 623, 631-32 (1967). The Otts have calculated that in 1964 the addition to
taxable base by including unrealized appreciation would be about $35 billion. They did not break
this figure out separately to obtain the effect on revenue in AGI classes.
16In 1959 Surrey noted that unreported income might be as high as $26.5 billion. Surrey, The
Federal Income Tax Base for Individuals, in HousE COMMITrEE ON WAYS AND MEANS, 86iH
CONG., lST SESS.,

1 TAX REVISION COMPENDIUM OF PAPERS ON BROADENING THE TAX BASE 1, 11

(Comm. Print 1959).
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as compared with others. It is contended that those who pool their capital
to operate a business should have the same after-tax effect on the business
profits irrespective of whether they operate in general partnership, limited
partnership, pool, syndicate, corporation, or some other form of business
association. A contrary argument is that the limited-liability feature of
corporate operation permits the amassing of capital to form the industrial
giants of modern American business, and, therefore, this feature is properly susceptible to some surcharge." The study proceeded on the assumption
that if the double taxation of the corporate income stream should be eliminated, several desirable mechanisms could be used: (1) The entire corporate income could be attributed to the shareholders on a partnership
basis similar to the pattern of present Subchapter S. (2) The corporate income could be subject to tax at a rate equal to, say, the highest individual
income tax-rate; and as income is distributed, the shareholder would "gross
up" his dividend receipt by the amount of tax paid at the corporate level
on his share of corporate earnings and claim a credit for the tax thus withheld. This technique is similar to that now applied in the case of withholding on wages and salaries and foreign taxes paid at the source on corporate distributions."' (3) The corporation could claim a deduction for dividends paid. (4) The dividends, once taxed at the corporate level, would
be excluded from the shareholder's gross income, a technique presently
recognized to a limited extent in the case of the $100 dividend exclusion.
Taking into account the revenue costs resulting from these methods and
the argument, alluded to above, that some differential in tax cost may be
justified for the corporate operation, the Otts then explored one modification-the constrained credit-a device which does not eliminate all the
double tax on the corporate income stream."'
17See

R.

GOODE, THE CORPORATION INCOME TAx 24-40

(1951).

"The gross-up-and-credit method is explained in Willis, Comments and Observations by the
Project Director, in STrUDIES IN SUBSTANTIVE TAx REFORM (1968):
Under the full credit concept, individuals receiving dividends whose marginal
tax rate was less than the corporate tax rate would receive a refund. Thus, assuming
an individual whose marginal tax rate on his dividend income was 20 per cent and

assuming a corporate tax rate of 48 per cent, he would receive a refund (or a credit
against income tax owed on other income) of 28 per cent of his grossed-up dividend
income. On $520 of actual dividend income, he would receive a refund (or its
equivalent) of $280, computed as follows:
$520
Actual dividend income
$1,000
Dividend income after gross-up for 48% corporate tax
Tax payable on $1,000 of grossed-up dividend
$200
income (marginal rate of 20%)
$480
Credit for corporate tax (at 48%)
$(280)
Net tax or (refund)
Thus, the low bracket taxpayer in this example really would receive $800 ($520
plus $280) of tax free income. What capital gain treatment can possibly be that good!
"' The constrained credit would limit the credit allowed for the corporate tax by the taxpayerrecipient's actual tax computed at his marginal tax rate on his grossed-up dividend income. Thus,
in the example given in note 10 supra, the constrained credit would be $200, computed as follows:

Actual dividend income
Dividend income after gross-up for 48% corporate tax
Tax payable on $1,000 of grossed-up dividend income,
assuming the marginal rate to be 20%
Credit for corporate tax, limited to tax paid on dividend

Refund

$520
$1,000
$200
$200

-0-

TAX REFORM PROJECT

1968]

TABLE 3

PARTNERSHIP TREATMENT OF CORPORATE INCOME
(millions of dollars)

Adjusted Gross
Income Class
0- 600
600- 1500
15003000-

3000
5000

5000-

7000

7000- 10000
10000- 15000
15000- 20000
20000- 25000
25000- 50000
50000-100000
100000-500000
50000-over

Total

Changein Tax
Revenue from
Imputation
501
811

Amount
Imputed
2081
509j
1,598
2,495

,168J
3,557,
4,931
3,917
2,423
7,809
6,193
2

5,985
2,341

44,134

23%

50%

Changein Tax
Revenue after
Removing Imputation
from BTB
59
96

285
533

12g

539J

33%

1,008j
1,586
1,503
1,025
4,049
3,847
4,122
1,638

20,265

342
641

627
1,161
1,814
1,708
1,160
4,379
4,025
4,178
1,639

21,830

Table 3 is an analysis of the partnership treatment of corporate income." Under the partnership treatment approximately twenty-three per
cent of the imputed income occurs in brackets from $0-10,000 and these
brackets account for approximately twelve per cent of the added revenue.
Similarly, approximately fifty per cent of the imputed income occurs in
brackets from $0-25,000 and these brackets account for approximately
thirty-three per cent of the added revenue. These figures belie the contention that the partnership treatment would soak the rich.
Professor Bernstein in his comments on the Otts' findings has considered
the partnership treatment as "probably unworkable, and possibly unconstitutional, as applied to large publicly-held corporations."" The administrative problems are formidable. The stockholder of a large corporation
would have to account for his aliquot share of corporate income, and unless the corporation distributed sufficient cash, he would have the problem
of seeking funds from other sources to meet the tax liability. Other problems would include the determination of the date the share of earnings
would be allocated, the burden of record-keeping imposed on the stockholder, the handling of adjustments to corporate income of prior years, the
calculation of the allocable share of income in cases in which there are several classes of stock with varying rights in corporate earnings, and the
20 Table 3 is typical of many similar tables relating to the analysis of base broadening items.
The Otts devised an ingenious method of presenting as to each base broadening item the tax revenue
by AGI classes as if the particular item were the only item added to the base and the difference
in tax revenue if all base broadening items were considered and the particular item was "peeled off."
21Bernstein, Some Legal Consideration in Substantive Tax Reform Proposals, in STUoms IN
Suts-rANTvE TAx REFo M (1968).
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treatment of shareholder recipients who under present rules are taxexempt."
Table 4 reflects the results of the "gross-up-and-credit" method, pursuant to which the tax withheld at the corporate level would be added to the
recipient-shareholder's income and credited to his tax liability. It is asTABLE 4

REVENUE EFFECTS OF GROSS-UP AND FULL CREDIT
OF DIVIDENDS, 1964
(millions of dollars)
(zero shifting)
(no change in dividends)

Change in Tax Revenue

Adjusted Gross Income Class

41.0
102.0
- 327.3
- 504.0
- 418.2
- 660.0
- 877.7
- 666.0
- 392.1
-1,091.4
682.3
-

0- 600
600- 1500
1500- 3000
3000- 5000
5000- 7000
7000- 10000
10000- 15000
15000- 20000
20000- 25000
25000- 50000
50000-100000
100000-500000
500000-over

-

512.3

185.8
-6,460.1

Total

sumed that (1) the corporate tax is not shifted, and that (2) dividend disstributions remain unaffected. With respect to these two qualifiers, some
comment should be made. In an economy of monopolistic competition the
corporate managers may shift the tax to the consumers in price or to one
of the production factors-labor, land, capital-in reduction of cost. If
the corporate tax is susceptible of 100 per cent shifting, the effect on shareholders is the same as if there were no tax.' The shifting effect may be
illustrated by the following example. Assume a selling price of $200, costs
of $100, a net income of $100, and a corporate tax of fifty per cent which
is not shifted, shifted fifty per cent, and shifted one hundred per cent.
Col. I
No tax
Price
Cost

Pre-tax net income
Corporate tax
After-tax net income
. distributed
Gross-up
Credit
5

Col. 3
Col. 2
Col. 4
No shifting 50% shifting 100 % shifting
$200
100

100

100
50

133.3

-

100
100
-

50
100
50

66.6
100
33.3

T'rION
INcom

TAX 44 (1951).

2/d.

2 R. GoooE, TH-E CO-o

$233.3
100

$200
100

66.6

$300
100
200
100
100

100
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In column 1 it is assumed that there is no corporate tax and all profits
are distributed. In column 2, if no part of the tax is shifted, or stated
otherwise, if the shareholders bear all the corporate tax, then the shareholders are entitled to a full gross-up and credit to place themselves in the
same position as if no corporate tax were imposed. In column 3 it is assumed that the corporate managers are able to make a price adjustment to
shift the tax to the consumer. In such case, only half the corporate tax is
borne by the shareholders; therefore, the gross-up and credit equals half the
tax." In column 4, there is complete shifting of the tax through price adjustment; therefore, no gross-up and credit is applied.
Table 5 reflects the effect of changes in dividend policy assuming the
gross-up and credit would impel an increase in dividends. Even with a
TABLE 5

REVENUE EFFECTS OF GROSS-UP AND FULL CREDIT
OF DIVIDENDS, 1964
(millions of dollars)

(zero shifting)

Adjusted Gross
Income Class
600
0600- 1500
15003000-

No Change
in Dividends
- 41.0
- 102.0

3000

5000

5000- 7000
7000- 10000

-

50% Rise in
Dividends
-

54.1
144.1

327.3

-

504.0

-

455.0
685.2

418.2
660.0

-

555.5

-

849.5

100% Rise in
Dividends
- 65.1
- 184.8
- 576.1
- 847.6
- 672.2
-1,003.6

10000- 15000

- 877.7

-1,089.3

-1,251.3

15000- 20000
20000- 25000

-

-

-

834.5
445.4

25000- 50000
50000-100000

-1,091.4

-1,015.5

-

858.9

512.3

-

-

100000-500000

-

164.3
187.9
97.1

500000-over
Total

666.0
392.1
682.3
185.8

-6,460.1

773.9
432.6
443.8
165.7
44.4

-6,708.5

-6,618.7

fifty per cent and one hundred per cent increase in dividends, the revenue
effects are not significantly different.1" This is an important revelation, for
p where P is the pre-tax corporate net income, P is the
1-St
corporate net income if there were no tax, t is the tax, and S is the shifting parameter. M. KazrZANIAK & R. MusGLRvE, TH-E SHFriNG OF TH CORPOA'TE INCOME TAx: AN EMa, nUcA.. STUDY
OF ITS SHORT-RuN EFCTS UPON THE RAT OF RETURNS 11-12 (1963). As an example, suppose
that the corporate tax rate, t, is equal to 509, the corporate net income if there were no tax, P1,
is $100, and the corporation can shift 50% of the tax. Assume that all corporate income after
, or P = $133. Thus, the corporate managers will
100
taxes is distributed. Then P =
1-.$ox.30
make a price adjustment or reduce costs to increase pre-tax net income by $33. This is illustrated
in col. 3.
23 In the lower adjusted gross income groups the increase in dividends causes an increase in the
tax revenue loss because the tax credit is greater than the marginal tax rate which the individual
pays on dividend income. The trend changes in the $1$-20,000 group because the marginal tax rate
is approximately equal to the corporate rate; increases in tax revenue in these brackets are almost
37The Otts used the formula P=
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if a change in corporate tax policy which would induce larger dividend
distributions should have a serious effect either for or against the fisc, such
change in policy would have to be approached warily. " This, however,
seems not to be the case from the Otts' findings. In the long run, of course,
the gross-up-and-credit method tends to approach, but never reaches, the
same result as the partnership method; that is, if all corporate earnings
were distributed, then, assuming no shifting, all taxes would be grossed up
and credited at the shareholder level."'
As has been mentioned above, the revenue implications of a full grossup and credit suggested some compromise proposal. Assuming that dividends received were grossed up by the amount of the tax paid at the corporate level, the Otts then determined the revenue implications of constraining, or restricting, the credit so that a taxpayer would claim the
credit against his tax but could not claim a refund. The constrained credit
may be critized as working haphazardly on individuals and thereby producing inequities. Thus, two individuals, each with the same salary, and
each with the same dividend income, but one having an unexpected loss
in some extraneous transaction, would have different tax consequences as
to dividends. One would receive the full credit; the other, after deducting
his loss, might produce a much reduced tax liability which would limit the
TABLE 6

REVENUE EFFECT OF GROSS-UP AND CONSTRAINED
CREDIT OF DIVIDENDS, 1964
(millions of dollars)
(zero shifting)
(no changes in dividends)

Adjusted Gross Income Class
0600

Change in Tax Revenue
8.2

-

14.3
52.6
89.8
77.1

-

131.6

-

193.2
185.2
122.8
498.3
521.1
506.5
185.7

600- 1500
1500- 3000
30005000
5000- 7000
7000- 10000
10000- 15000
15000- 20000
20000- 25000
25000- 50000
50000-100000
100000-500000

-

500000-over
Total

-

-

-

-

-

-2,586.5

entirely offset by the tax credit. In the highest brackets, the increases in dividends are not entirely
offset by the credit, and as the dividend income is doubled in these brackets, the credit factor becomes a smaller percentage of the tax on the dividend.
This offsetting of the effect on the lower income groups against that experienced in the higher
income groups also explains why the revenue loss, assuming a 507 rise in dividends, is about the
same as the revenue loss, assuming a 100% rise in dividends.
2 Brittain notes that if 1929 income tax rates had been in effect in 1947 the payout ratio
would have been 40 percentage points higher and dividends would have been 112% higher than
they were in 1947. J. BRTrrTAIN, CoRPoRATE DIVIDEND POLIcY 205 (1966).
'I If the dividend-profits ratio were 1, then all corporate profits would be taxed at the stock-

holder-recipients' respective tax rates.
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dividends-received credit. Table 6 is the result of this study. Note that the
revenue loss under the constrained credit is $2.586 billion as contrasted
with $6.460 billion under the full credit. Table 7 is the result of the constrained credit assuming a fifty per cent and a one hundred per cent rise
in dividends respectively.
TABLE 7

REVENUE EFFECT OF GROSS-UP AND CONSTRAINED
CREDIT OF DIVIDENDS, 1964
(millions of dollars)
(zero shifting)

0-

8.2
14.3
52.6
89.8
77.1
131.6
193.2
185.2
122.8
498.3
521.1

-

9.5
15.0
54.4
91.4
74.1
123.1
171.4
163.6
102.2
368.3
309.8

- 10.3
- 15.5
- 56.1
- 92.8
- 71.0
-114.3
-148.8
-137.3
- 70.7
-184.3
- 45.5

-

506.5

-

162.5

190.1

-

185.7

-

44.4

600
1500
3000
5000
7000
10000
15000
20000
25000
50000

-

50000-100000
100000-500000

-

500000-over

60015003000-

5000700010000150002000025000-

-

97.1

-659.6

-1,689.5

-2,586.5

Total

100% Rise in
Dividends

50% Rise in
Dividends

No Change
in Dividends

Adjusted Gross
Income Class

TABLE 8

REVENUE EFFECTS OF ALTERNATIVE TAX TREATMENTS
OF DIVIDENDS: GROSS-UP AND FULL CREDIT, GROSS-UP
AND CONSTRAINED CREDIT, AND 100% DIVIDEND EXCLUSION
(millions of dollars)
(zero usifting)
(no changes in dividends)

Gross-Up and
Full Credit

Adjusted Gross
Income Class

0- 600 - 41.0
600- 1500 - 102.0 L
1500- 3000 - 327.3 15%
3000- 5000 - 504.0J
50007000100001500020000-

7000
10000
15000
20000
25000

-

-

418.2
660.0
877.7
666.0
392.1

-

682.3

100000-500000 - 512.3
500000-over

Total

-

185.8

-6,460.1

-

-

0.0

8.2l

14.3 6
52.6 6.4%
89.8f

-

67 1.7%
-

34.8J
56.9
95.8
179.5
176.6
136.3

-

-

498.3

-

521.1

-

506.5

- 531.8j

-

185.7f

-

-

38%

100% Dividend
Exclusion

77.1
131.6
193.2
185.2
122.8

-

-

25000- 50000 -1,091.4
50000-100000

Gross-Up and
ConstrainedCredit

-2,586.5

-

-

-

- 513.11
66%

-

573.6.

131.4J
-2,436.8

73%
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Table 8 compares the two methods-gross-up and full credit and grossup and constrained credit-with a complete exclusion of dividend income
from the taxable base of individuals. In adjusted gross income (AGI)
classes $0-5000 the "full credit" accounts for fifteen per cent of the revenue loss, the constrained credit for 6.4 per cent of the revenue loss, and
the dividend exclusion, 1.7 per cent of the revenue loss."' The AGI brackets of $25,000 and above would account for thirty-eight per cent of the
revenue loss under the full credit, sixty-six per cent under the constrained
credit, and seventy-three per cent under the dividend exclusion. Allowing
a deduction to the corporation for dividends distributed, the revenue loss
is the same as the gross-up and full credit. These significantly different al-.
locations of effect among AGI classes require a more intensive analysis in
order to provide the basis for policy choices.
As was noted earlier, BTB also assumes that sales of corporate stock and
unrealized appreciation in stock at the end of the year would be included
in full as part of the taxable base. Thus, the $58.6 billion of added base
consists of $35 billion in net unrealized increments in stock value, $11.2
billion of previously nonincluded capital gains on stock sales, and $12.4
billion of grossed up dividends.
IV.

INFLUENCE ON CORPORATE MANAGERS AND SHlREHOLERS

All the tabulations previously described relate to first-order effects; thus,
in each case the assumption has been that the actions of corporate managers in the money market remain the same. Any major study in substantive tax reform would have to consider second-order and third-order
effects in response to fundamental changes in corporate tax policy."' All of
the methods described would probably have the effect of impelling greater
distributions of corporate earnings than at present. Growth companies
would tend to distribute earnings and then resort to the money market
for new capital. If dividends were nontaxable, or if the shareholder could
look forward to credits for taxes paid at the corporate level, he would
probably withdraw funds from interest-bearing securities in favor of stock
investments. Thus, there would be a tendency to cause a flight from savings and loan and similar accounts. On the other hand, the treatment of
realized and unrealized capital gains as part of the taxable base would
have countervailing effects on the attractiveness of the stock market investments. The reallocation of resources against the background of such
fundamental changes in tax policy would have to be carefully analyzed in
a long range project.
Of special significance would be the effect on closely held corporations.
" The gross-up-and-full-credit will produce refunds in the lower brackets, because the taxpayers' marginal rates are less than the corporate tax rate. When the credit is constrained, the refunds in the lower brackets are eliminated so that these brackets do not contribute as much to the
overall loss in revenue as is the case with the full credi, In the case of the 100% dividend exclusion there is neither a grossing-up factor nor a refund or credit factor in the lower brackets so
that the contribution to the overall revenue loss from these brackets is relatively smaller than in
either of the other two methods.
"For a recent analysis of second-order and third-order effects of present tax policy, see R.
BAa.O7, I-L BA-zsR & J. MORGAN, EcoNomic BEHAVIOR OP THE AFFLuENT 151-71 (1966).
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At present, these corporations tend to pay as large salaries as possible to
officer-stockholders and little or no dividends. The threat of section 531"
taxes often impels the owners to sell to or exchange stock with larger,
listed, companies in order to bail out accumulated earnings at capital gains
and to achieve estate liquidity. Under the varicus mechanisms described
herein, the complex statutory provisions, regulations, rulings, and problems
of administration and compliance relating to unreasonable accumulations
of earnings,"1 personal holding companies,"' collapsible corporations," redemptions of stock," and the like, could be reduced to a minimum or
eliminated altogether.
All of the foregoing considerations relating to effects on corporate managers and shareholders must be considered in light of substantial reduction
in rates. If substantive tax reform means anything, it must mean drastic
reduction in rates. Whether it be a flat rate of, say, ten to fifteen per cent,
or a graduated rate from, say, five to thirty-five per cent, one cannot
speculate on effects as the tax law is but as it may come to be. In making
critical judgments about proposals, one finds it difficult not to look at them
in the perspective of the present law, whereas personal motivations, interactions in the economy, and choices of business and investment activity
would be quite different under a system of lower rates and a substantially
broadened base.
V. THE REPORT OF THE ROYAL COMMISS6IN ON TAXATION

No discussion of the subject of substantive tax reform would be complete without reference to the recently published major study of the Canadian tax system (the Carter report)." There, much of the same rhetoric
is employed to urge basic reform in tax policy. A broadened tax base
conforming to the Haig-Simons definition, lower rates, and elimination of
the double tax on corporate income, are included in the multi-volume report. With respect to the corporate tax, a so-called full-integration system
was proposed as follows:
1. The income of Canadian corporations should be subject to a flat rate of
tax of approximately 50 per cent.
2. Individuals and families should be subject to progressive rates of tax with
a top marginal rate of 50 per cent.
3. The tax base of the resident shareholder should include the corporate income paid or allocated to him, 'grossed-up' for the corporation tax paid.
4. The resident shareholder should receive credit against his personal income
tax liabilities for the full amount of the corporation tax paid in respect
of the after-tax corporate income paid or allocated to him, with a refund
if the credit exceeded the liability.
$. Realized gains or losses on corporate shares should be included in income
and taxed at full progressive rates.
30INT. REV. CODE of 1954, S

531.

31 Id.

2IM. § $41.
3id. § 341.
34Id. §S 302, 337, 346.
'REPORT

OF THE ROYAL COMM'N ON TAXATION

(CANADA)

(6 vols.)

(1966).
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6. The corporation should be allowed to allocate after-tax corporate income
to shareholders without having to pay cash dividends.
7. The cost basis of shares should be increased when the corporation allocated
retained corporate earnings to shareholders, so that share gains resulting
from the retention of earnings that had been taxed to the shareholder
would not be taxed again to the shareholder when realized."
It should be noted that the above proposals combine a gross-up-andcredit mechanism with an optional Subchapter S treatment; that is, after
the gross-up and credit is applied to dividends received, the board of directors might allocate retained earnings on the partnership basis.
VI. CONCLUSION

The Substantive Tax Reform Project is a demonstration of the kind of
research that must and ultimately will be carried forward by someone. It
is my hope, of course, that lawyers will assume the leadership in this work
as they have in other areas where efficiency and effectiveness of the laws
were at stake. Lawyers have the skill and training to assemble and analyze
facts, drawing upon the skills of other disciplines. Nor is this the kind of
project that can be done by half-measures. The Canadians spent millions
on the Carter report and certainly this country could do no less. The computer provides an invaluable new component in inter-disciplinary research.
Data can be arranged in numerous patterns using a variety of assumptions
and sub-assumptions not heretofore feasible or practicable.
In no area of inquiry is the need for careful critical analysis more important than that of the corporate tax. Whatever choice of policy is made
as to the corporate tax will have profound significance on American industry and the incentives to the formation of capital in this country.
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